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Abstract:  
 
The EU as well as other major international organizations have increasingly placed a link 
between security and development policies at the centre of their foreign policy. Yet, 
profound controversy over the value and practical consequences of such a link exists. In 
this paper, we aim at disentangling the various dimensions of the security-development 
nexus. We attempt to order the debate, investigate current claims of the relation between 
security and development, and investigate in how far current policy response are 
sufficient and whether they imply a superiority of security or of development measures. 
We argue that thinking the security development nexus requires us to rely on non-
dogmatic, non-paradigmatic ideas, to accept the contingency (or uncertainty) of our 
knowledge, and to address in analytical and policy practice situation-specific problems.  
Our discussion is structured in four sections. The first section carves out some accessible 
routes of the conceptual jungle of the security-development nexus. We discuss the 
underlying concepts of Security and Development briefly, and three major frameworks 
(Peacebuilding, Human Security, and the Global War on Terror) The second section 
discusses a range of claims that have been made in the framework of the Security 
Development Nexus. We shall investigate the vicious circle argument and the threatening 
character of underdevelopment on a global, regional and national level. What follows 
from this discussion is that hardly any claim goes uncontested. In other words, our 
knowledge about the dynamics is limited, and we should treat any claim to secured 
knowledge with suspicion. Section three firstly introduces the major policy responses. 
Those responses can be meaningful differentiated in, one, architectural responses – the 
re-organization and maintenance of new bureaucratic infrastructures –, two emergency 
responses policies – tools developed to cope with situations that have identified as 
emergency situations –, three, long-term structural policies directed towards prevention 
and re-construction – policies in post-conflict situations, situations that are on the verge 
of the outbreak of conflict, and policies towards countries which are in a long-term 
violent state. We shall discuss, the policies in the light of whether the responses lead to a 
subordination of development policies, to the dissolution of meaningful security 
strategies, and whether they increase efficiency and effectivity. Section four, concludes in 
arguing the need for pragmatic problem solving strategies. 
 
 
Keywords: Security-Development Nexus; Fragile States, Coordination, Securitzation 
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1. Introduction: Disentangling the Security-Development Nexus  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, major international organizations and governments 
have emphasized the nexus between security and development and underlined the need to 
link security and development policies. For instance, the fifth principle of OECD DAC’s 
Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States recognizes:  
 
“(...) the political-security-development nexus: The political, security, 
economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure 
in all others. International actors should move to support national 
reformers in developing unified planning frameworks for political, 
security, humanitarian, economic and development activities at a country 
level.” (OECD DAC recommendation nr.5 of the principles of good 
international engagement in fragile states  
http://www.opml.co.uk/extranet/ppfs/principles/5_recognise_the.html)  
 
All the major security and development documents of the EU point to a linkage 
between security and development. The recent European Council Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy, for example, emphasizes this point:  
 
 “As the ESS [European Security Strategy] and the 2005 Consensus on 
Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable 
development without peace and security, and without development and 
poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace” (European Council 
Report on the implementation for the European Security Strategy 2008:12)  
 
Some prominent international initiatives – drawing on the 2005 Paris Declaration on 
aid efficiency and the proposals and commitments of the Accra High Level Forum, 
leading to the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) –, like The International Dialogue on 
Peacebuilding and State-Building –organized jointly by OECD DAC and the UN 
Peacebuilding Support Office – stress the need to develop realistic objectives “that 
address the root causes of conflict and fragility” (AAA 2008) by bringing together 
“different policy communities (development, defence, diplomacy)” (UN Peacebuilding 
Support Office 2009:2). These actors all stress the importance of linking security and 
development policies in addressing conflict and fragility.  
 
As such, the link between development and security is nothing new. In fact, since the 
inception of the notion of development at the end of the 1940s, security concerns and 
motivations have been deeply influential in development policies. In the U.S., the 1947 
Marshall Plan and Truman doctrine, some of the influential post-World War II initiatives 
in postwar development policies later transferred to Asia, Africa and Latin America, have 
been shaped not only by economic motives but most significantly by vital security 
considerations (Leffler 1992, 157-164). When the U.S. Congress merged together 
economic and military aid in October 1951, the new development policy was called the 
“Mutual Security Program” and, in 1963, the U.S. President’s study group concerned 
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with foreign aid was officially called “The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the 
Free World.” (Packenham 1973: 25-58) The security dimension of development aid, 
while contested (see notably, Banfield 1963, 4-36), remained strong throughout the Cold 
War. Influential British economist and major figure of development studies Ernst 
Friedrich Schumacher also emphasized in the mid-1970s that only genuine development 
could avoid the threat of violent revolutions (Duffield 2001, 35).  
 
Still, what actually constitutes this linkage between development and security, its 
characteristics and its consequences for the European Union, remains elusive and 
disputed. The notions of development and security are broad and often ill-defined and the 
link between them can refer to many different, potentially contradictory, ends and means. 
Moreover, the nexus between security and development is criticized as an attempt to 
subordinate help to poor people to the short term security concerns of Western nation 
states and their elites. Connecting development and security might also turn virtually 
everything that happens in fragile countries into a security threat for the European Union, 
making it difficult to assess the relative importance of these threats, to develop a clear 
focus and to design appropriate strategies. However, the possibility to improve the 
connection between development and security can also be a major opportunity for the EU 
in order to achieve greater policy coherence among heterogeneous policy fields which 
could lead to greater efficiency of its development policy. Thanks to such a better 
coordination it should become possible to break the vicious circle between insecurity and 
poverty, and to implement a policy agenda that aims at removing the root causes of 
conflict.  
 
There are also disagreements on the current state of policy coordination between 
development and security. For some, the international merging of development and 
security agencies and policies has already been a fact of life for some time as 
administrations, academics, military establishments, NGOs, private security companies, 
etc. have morphed into an inclusive, organic and transparent network (Duffield 2001, 35-
36). For others, however, the coordination between development and security agencies 
and policies in the EU is fraught with difficulties, has barely started and should become 
one the key policy priority for the future (Support Study 2009). For the EU, the overlap 
between development and security also raises sensitive political and legal questions of 
demarcation of powers between the Pillars. The attribution of policy instruments to the 
Union’s Security and Defense Policy or to the Community’s development policy has 
major implications for the applicability of the Community method or 
intergovernmentalism and these issues will persist even if the Lisbon treaty comes into 
force (Hoffmeister 2008).  
 
In this paper, we aim at disentangling the various dimensions of the security-
development nexus in the European Union development policy and, in so doing, 
presenting and discussing the current state of the policy and academic research in that 
domain. We develop five main arguments.  
 
First, since the early 1990s, many different approaches, concepts and categories have 
been linking security and development. Policy-makers and analysts are facing complex 
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conceptual landscape which needs to be clarified. This situation is fostered by the fact 
that concepts proliferating under the same name tend to have different meanings. For 
example, Human security and Peacebuilding suggest different links between security and 
development, and they come in a narrow and in a broad version.  
 
Second, since the beginning of the U.S.-led ‘Global War on Terror’ (now officially 
called the Long War), development policies have been re-evaluated and several threats to 
the security of Western states, including the EU, have been related to situations of 
fragility. Policymakers and analysts have argued that less developed states and situations 
of fragility might breed terrorism, facilitate piracy and more generally create instability in 
the international system. While this re-framing of the security implications of situations 
of fragility might be problematic, it is not clear that it has led to crucial practical changes 
in European development policies. The securitization of development policies should not 
be overestimated. Moreover, development has always been related to political and 
security projects and this should be kept in mind if relief, aid and assistance are 
evaluated.  
 
Third, development practitioners have been at times exaggerating, in their own way, 
security threats in order to get political attention, particularly in the framework of human 
security. Yet, not only do development practitioners and scholars have come to recognize 
that the security justification of development policies has been partially overstretched, 
also more flexible concepts point out that meaningful country-specific development and 
security strategies remain possible for the EU.  
 
Fourth, linking security and development through “whole of the EU” approaches has 
certainly benefits for more efficient policies, notably in avoiding the most glaring 
contradictions. Yet, coordination and administrative integration are not the only ways to 
cope with challenges of fragility and conflict. We underline the limits of current 
coordination and integration efforts and the importance of relying on pragmatic, problem-
oriented ideas, rather than to fall back on “grand schemes of improvement” (Scott 1998).  
 
Five, the notion of vicious circles suggesting that protracted fragility and conflict is to 
be explained by an equilibrium of under-development and insecurity is a valuable (albeit 
not new) perspective. Yet, the related policy agenda aiming at addressing root causes by 
state- and nation- building policies has its limits. Policy-makers and analysts’ causal 
knowledge might be too limited to pursue confidently this agenda. This raises the need to 
think in more flexible terms, and consider other medium-term political measures that go 
beyond addressing root cause. Often addressing the root causes cannot help to change the 
life of populations in zones of fragility and conflict immediately. More emphasis can be 
put on political negotiations and short and medium term arrangements which might not 
necessarily follow the long term objective of building a state.  
 
In short, borrowing from Albert Hirschman’s classic analysis of development 
policies, we argue that in dealing with the security-development nexus, the EU’s action 
would benefit from: “(...) a little more ‘reverence for life’, a little less straitjacketing of 
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the future, a little more allowance for the unexpected – and a little less wishful thinking.” 
(Hirschman 1970: 239)  
  
Our paper is organized in four sections.  
 
The first section carves out some accessible routes in the conceptual jungle of the 
security-development nexus as a response to situations of fragility. We present the 
underlying concepts of Security and Development and then turn to the three major 
frameworks linking security and development: Peacebuilding, Human Security, and the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT). We suggest that these approaches can be sorted in two 
ways: whose security they take as a referent object and how they argue for the 
convergence or divergence between security and development.  
 
The second section discusses the main claims that have been made regarding the 
security development nexus. We investigate the vicious circle argument, i.e. the 
threatening character of underdevelopment on a global, regional and national level. We 
also emphasize that the existing knowledge about these dynamics remains limited, and 
that basing policies on isolated claims might be problematic.  
 
Section three introduces the major policy responses of the security-development 
nexus. Those responses can be differentiated into architectural responses (the re-
organization and maintenance of new bureaucratic infrastructures), emergency responses 
policies (tools developed to cope with situations that have identified as emergency 
situations), and long-term structural policies directed towards prevention and re-
construction (policies in post-conflict situations, situations that are on the verge of the 
outbreak of conflict, and policies towards countries which are in a long-term violent 
state). We discuss these policies in the light of whether the responses lead to a 
subordination of development policies, to the dissolution of meaningful security 
strategies, and whether they increase efficiency and effectivity.  
 
Section four, concludes in arguing the need for pragmatic problem solving strategies.  
 
 
2. What is Security? What is Development? How are they Related?  
 
2.1. Two ambiguous concepts: Security and Development 
 
The link between security and development is difficult to assess in part because the 
notions of security and development themselves are fuzzy and changing. As Richard 
Young observed,  
 
“interviews with policy makers reveal that as this link has been placed 
increasingly at the centre of EU foreign policy it has engendered notable 
discrepancies over basic definitions of what constitutes ‘development’ and 
what constitutes ‘security’.” (Young 2008: 426)  
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Both security and development are relational terms, inviting policy-makers and 
analysts to ask, among other things, whose security, and whose development they are 
concerned about. While all the conceptual difficulties might not be solved, a brief 
conceptual history of both terms will clarify the issues.  
 
Security and Development: Brief Conceptual Histories  
 
In policy-making, both security and development are of relatively recent origins as 
they have been developed and increasingly employed in the aftermath of the Second 
World War (Huntington 1971, Escobar 1995, Rist 1997, Waever 2006).  
 
Ole Waever (2004, 2006, Buzan and Waever 2007) suggests that in the 1940s the 
concept of security “moved to the centre becoming the guiding idea over previously 
supreme aims like defence and national interest” (Buzan and Waever 2007: 386). During 
the Cold War, the core security concerns were nuclear policies of nuclear, the prevention 
of inter-state war and preservation of national integrity, as well as the geo-strategic 
positioning in an evolving balance of power. In sum, the dominant understanding of 
security emphasized national integrity (national security), military and defense policies 
which included an increased focus science and technological (nuclear weapons and 
conventional weapon systems).  
 
Early ideas of development emerged out of post-World War II U.S. initiatives such as 
the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe and Truman’s Fair Deal (Huntington 1971, 
Escobar 1995, Rist 1997). The Marshall Plan was directed, in Marshall’s own words, 
against “hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos” which is as good a definition of 
fragility as any. American leaders feared that poverty and hunger would make Western 
European countries vulnerable to Communist appeals. However, although the Marshall 
Plan was part of the containment of Soviet expansionism, Congress initially prohibited 
the use of Marshall Plan assistance for military supplies. It is also important to note the 
Marshall Plan’s legacy has been institutional as well, from the Committee on European 
Economic Cooperation (CEEC), to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC), in charge of the distribution of Marshall Plan funds in Western Europe, to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) founded in 1961, 
envisioned in part as continuing the Marshall Plan with developed market countries 
joining the United States as donors and with states in the developing world to be the 
recipients.  
 
While initially associated to Cold War U.S. foreign policy, development partially 
differentiated itself from political and security concerns in the 1970s. Part of this 
differentiation led to a de-politicization of development policies (Huntington 1971). The 
three core components of this understanding of development were as follows: under-
development is a problem of poverty, poverty is defined in terms of Gross Domestic 
Products and per-capita income, and the emphasis on economic measures (such as credit, 
currency, or market reforms). While development was conceptualized as an inter-state 
affair, the multilateral institutions of development, gained in importance.  
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Enlarging Security and Development  
 
With the end of the Cold War, both the notions of security and development were 
broadened.  
 
The notion of security was enlarged for three main reasons (Buzan 1983). First, the 
easing of the tensions between the superpowers allowed for concerns and priorities other 
than nuclear deterrence and the risk of a major conventional war in Europe. Second, the 
increasing recognition of economic interdependence and the importance of resources led 
to different security concerns (Daase 1991). Third, there was also an increasing 
recognition that the major security concerns were only of limited relevance for most 
developing countries. In consequence, security was widened to cover, beyond military 
issues, economic, environmental and political stability, as well as deepened concerning 
not just states but individuals, regions, minorities, humans, companies, etc.  
 
Development was equally broadened, in part because the results of previous 
development policies had been disappointing. The concept was widened moving from 
pure economic issues to include institutions, such as property regimes, and governance 
and regulating institutions and stretched further to cover well-being or happiness. 
Development was also deepened recognizing the importance of regional integration, sub-
state actors (social capital), as well as households (as a unit of analysis) and, as expressed 
in the human development paradigm, humans.  
 
These debates about the broadening of security and development continue as the two 
notions refer to different needs and interests.  
 
Approaches to Security and Development  
 
By security, we mean the absence of threats to central values and the absence of fear 
that such values will be threatened (Wolfers 1962). By development, we mean the 
improvement of men and women’s capacity to achieve their human potential, 
individually and collectively. The main objective of EU development cooperation is the 
eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including the pursuit of 
the eight Millenium Development Goals: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve 
universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce the 
mortality rate of children, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for 
development (European Consensus 2005).  
 
These are working definitions providing a preliminary identification of the themes in 
discussion, not attempts at capturing abstract essences. Both security and development 
ultimately refer to the objective of human well-being and we are fully aware what 
constitutes human well being is contested. Furthermore, security and development 
suggest different sets of historically grown, institutionally embedded and legitimized 
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practices, different repertoire of actions (Der Derian 1995, Huysmans 1998, Esteva 
1992). Moreover, framing policy problems as being problems of security or as 
development (or both) allows for a certain kind of understanding and of actions. Raising 
the question of what can be done with the security tool box and what can be done with 
the development toolbox can be a productive way out of seeing security and development 
either as convergent or divergent objectives.  
 
Different issues can be framed as security and/or development issues (Buzan et al. 
1997, Waever 1995, 1998): (1) referent object: whose security or development are we 
concerned about? (2) issues: What is the issue that threatens the object? What is the issue 
that constraints the object? (3) measures: What are the measures that can protect the 
object from the threat? What are the measures that can remove the constraint from the 
object?  
 
2.2. Organizing the Debate on the Development-Security Nexus  
 
The existing academic research and policy analysis on the development-security 
nexus can be organized in two dimensions. First, whose security and whose development 
is concerned: this is the question of the major referent objects. Second, the scope of 
security and development (from limited to wide).  
 
Whose Security? Whose Development? Referent Objects  
 
As part of the deepening debate of security and development a range of referent 
objects other than the nation state have been identified. While none of the existing 
approaches explored below centers exclusively on one referent object, they can be 
categorized by which referent objects they include and which they exclude (or 
marginalize). Figure one differentiates between referent objects.  
 
Figure 1: Referent Objects 
 
 
The first axis is between an international/global level and a sub-state level. While we 
do recognize the limits of a domestic/foreign distinction (given the deterritorilization 
processes of globalization, e.g. through diasporas, global flows of capital, and the role of 
multilateral organizations, as well as the changing status and value of sovereignty), we 
nonetheless think such a distinction is helpful.  
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The second axis distinguishes between the major donors and contributors (“the 
North”) and to the major aid receivers or those regions immediately affected by SDN 
politics (“the South”) (on the limit of this distinction: Weiss 2009).  
 
In the international domain we differentiate between a global referent (meaning 
references to global stability, “international peace and stability”, “the international 
community”, global markets and trade relations), a regional one (referring to a territory 
which comprises of several states, or to a regional organization (EU, AU, EAC, 
ECOWAS, SADC), and a state referent (referring to UN recognized nation states).  
 
In the domestic domain we identify the following referents: the regime (referring to 
the government in power, meaning a political faction having control over the capital as 
well as over major national infrastructures), the people or the population (understood as 
an aggregation of the individuals living in a state territory), groups (as referring to any 
kind of self-organized social, economic or political unit, not limited to cities, villages, 
interest groups, companies, ethnicities, clans, tribes, or networks of organized crime) and 
individuals (referring to persons living in a state territory or holding formal citizenship of 
the state).  
 
Scope, Convergence and Divergence 
 
Our second major category considers the scope of security and development and 
whether there is a some compatibility between the two. Figure two projects these 
dimensions as a graph.  
 
 
Figure 2: Convergence, Divergence and Orthodoxy 
 
 
The first axis considers whether primacy is given to security or development. By the 
primacy of security regarding ends and means, including military force. With the primacy 
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of development, the focus is mainly on classical development goals and tools (such as 
expert assistance, credit, financial aid or relief).  
 
The second axis refers to the different ideas in how far security and development 
toolboxes are compatible with each other. Positions that argue for a complete 
convergence might suggest that existing organizations and practices can be in principle 
integrated through reforms. These transformations could in the long run mean reforms, 
such as the transformation of military organizations into civil-military intervention 
forces, or the re-organization of government from separate ministries of foreign affairs, 
development and defense into one (e.g. a ministry of crisis prevention, or of human 
security). Another position would recognize that security and development are 
historically grown institutions and practices, which are for practical or logical reasons 
distinct from one another but not incompatible. The emphasis here is not on integration, 
but on coordination, understood as the organization of the relations of formally 
independent units. Yet another position might emphasize that the gap is much wider 
between knowledge, practices and institutions and that even coordination might be, 
except under the most exceptional circumstances, a tremendously difficult task (see in 
particular: Komer 1972; Hunt 1995).  
 
We now put this framework to the task by exploring the current state of the academic 
and policy debates by analyzing three approaches of the link between security and 
development: peacebuilding, human security, and the war on terror. We shall give a brief 
historical introduction to the emergence of each approach, discuss the controversies and 
different versions, and close with a summary explaining how each approach fit into our 
categorizations. This is important not only for the sake of conceptual clarity, but also to 
avoid mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings among practitioners.  
 
2.3 The Security-Development Nexus in Peacebuilding 
 
In a broad sense, peacebuilding refers to discourses and practices that aim at creating 
or facilitating peace. The notion of peacebuilding has two main origins. The first is the 
writings of the peace researcher Johan Galtung, notably his 1975 article on “three 
approaches to peace”. The second is the UN reports “Agenda for Peace” (1992) and 1995 
“Agenda for Development” (1995) produced under the auspices of UN Secretary General 
Boutros Ghali. While the concept did not feature high on the political agendas in the early 
1990s, it gained traction in the late 1990s, with the re-emphasis on the concept by the 
influential Brahimi Report (1999 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
(known as the “Brahimi Report” after the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General 
Lakhdar Brahimi), and the creation of a new inter-governmental organization devoted to 
Peacebuilding, the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2006, following the 
recommendation of the High Level Panel on Threats Challenge and Change (2005) and 
the 2005 UN World Summit.  
 
The concept is widely used and is one of the major frameworks of thinking the 
security-development nexus. As Michael Barnett and his colleagues (2007: 35) observe, 
“an impressive number of organizations contribute to the cause of ending and preventing 
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deadly conflict and use the concept to frame and organize their postconflict activities”. 
Drawing on an analogy to the Washington Consensus on Development, Richmond (2004, 
2005) goes as far as arguing that meanwhile something like a “Peacebuilding Consensus” 
has evolved. He suggests, that  
 
 “There seems to be a general agreement upon 'peaceful' strategies used to 
respond to conflict involving international organizations, institutions, 
agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but less so on the 
issue of the use of force. The outcome of this process is projected as a 
construction of liberal democracy, with a free market and globalized 
economy, progressive development strategies, and guaranteed human 
rights. […} It [the Peacebuilding Consensus] has been deployed in most 
post-Cold War interventions, where the stated objective was rarely less 
than opening the way for free and fair elections from Cambodia in the 
early 1990s to Kosovo at the end of the decade.” (Richmond 2004:132) 
 
While Richmond is right in pointing out that a broad consensus has evolved that 
peacebuilding incorporates a wide range of measures centered around the establishment 
of liberal democracy free and globalized markets and human rights, two different ideal 
conceptions of peacebuilding proliferate.  
 
One conception in the legacy of Boutros-Ghali introduction of the concept 
understands it as referring to activities in-between conflict (civil war, genocide) and the 
employment of a peacekeeping force on the one side, and broader development (or 
statebuilding) strategies on the other. This understanding, which we refer to the narrow 
version of Peacebuilding conceptualizes it as a concept referring to the transition from 
conflict-policies to development-policies.  
 
The second ideal-typical version, which we shall refer to as the broad version of 
Peacebuilding, follows the footsteps of Galtung’s understanding. Here the focus is on 
wider, encompassing strategies that can prevent and manage conflict and help to maintain 
peace. In other words, this understanding promotes the idea of peacebuilding as a 
development strategy with a conflict-sensitive component. The narrow version sees 
Peacebuilding as one set of measures in the overall strategy towards fragility, 
differentiating it from other tools such as peacekeeping, prevention, state-building and 
development policies. The broad version, in turn, largely equates Peacebuilding with 
development policies towards fragility, while adding a distinct security component to it. 
Let us briefly investigate both versions.  
 
The narrow version of Peacebuilding 
 
Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and 
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid 
relapse into conflict.” Peacebuilding was understood as an independent issue serving to 
complement the UN’s activities in peacemaking (understood as diplomatic activities) and 
peacekeeping (understood largely as military activities). As explained in the Supplement 
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to an Agenda for Peace the essential goal was “the creation of structures for the 
institutionalization of peace.”  
 
 
As developed in the Supplement to the Agenda (1994) and the Agenda for 
Development (1995) the underlying logic can be summarized as: diplomats can ‘prevent’ 
and ‘make’ peace, soldiers can ‘keep’ the peace, others have to ‘build’ it. Peacebuilding 
was initially associated with democratization (the creation of democratic structures), 
meaning pivotally the organization of elections (see above) and the concept was 
understood as restricted to post-conflict engagement, following sequentially a 
peacekeeping mission.  
 
The Brahimi Report defined peacebuilding similar. But reflected on the extension of 
mandates of peacekeeping operations. Peacebuilding was understood as  
 
 “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the 
foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those 
foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, 
peacebuilding includes but is not limited to reintegrating former 
combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for 
example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial 
and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the 
monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; 
providing technical assistance for democratic development (including 
electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict 
resolution and reconciliation techniques.” (PUNPO para 14). 
 
The motivation of the definition  of the Brahimi Report is clearly seen as a response 
to the practical challenge on how to organize the relation of military and civil 
components of a peacekeeping mission. The framework of Peacebuilding was here used 
to organize civil-military coordination in the immediate aftermath of conflict.  
 
A widely used (narrow) definition is given by Roland Paris (2004: 38). He defines 
peacebuilding as  
 
 “action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and 
prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peacebuilding mission involves the 
deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international 
agencies, with a mandate to conduct peacebuilding in a country that is just 
emerging from a civil war”. 
 
In sum, in such a definition Peacebuilding is clearly limited to activities that take 
place in locations after a major conflict has ended and as figure three aims to highlight, 
peacebuilding is seen as a sequence of different activities addressing conflict.  
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Figure 3: The Narrow (Sequential) Version of Peacebuilding 
 
 
 
The main critiques towards such an understanding stress that it is unclear when a 
conflict or civil war actually has ended, that it is problematic to separate (mainly military) 
peacekeeping activities from (mainly civil) peacebuilding activities, as often violence can 
immediately break out again although a situation has been declared as post-conflict (as in 
the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC)) (Autussere 
2009). Also it has been argued – by advocates of a wider understanding (e.g. Tschirgi 
2004) – that contrasting peacebuilding with the independent activities of statebuilding 
and peacekeeping actually hinders the close coordination between those activities.  
 
The broad version of Peacebuilding 
 
Galtung (1975) argued to distinguish between three conceptual approaches of creating 
peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. In Galtung's terms peacebuilding 
referred to the development of structures “that remove causes of wars and offer 
alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur.” This encompassing 
understanding of Peacebuilding formed, as Beatrice Pouligny (in Peacebuilding Initiative 
2008) puts it “intellectual antecedents of today's notion of peacebuilding: an endeavor 
aiming to create sustainable peace by addressing the ‘root causes’ of violent conflict and 
eliciting indigenous capacities for peaceful management and resolution of conflict.” Such 
a wider understanding of peacebuilding that focuses on structural policies and does not 
follow a sequential understanding was for instance laid out by the High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change. The report defined two different types of peacebuilding. 
The first type of “peacekeepers as peacebuilders” refers to the confidence building 
measures, the deterrence of the outbreak of new violence and policing (para 221-223). 
The second type “the larger peacebuilding task” refers Peacebuilding to situations when 
peacekeepers have left a territory and suggests that the concept entails  
 
“Along with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to 
build effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil 
society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the 
rule of law. Relatively cheap investments in civilian security through 
police, judicial and rule-of-law reform, local capacity-building for human 
rights and reconciliation, and local capacity-building for public sector 
service delivery can greatly benefit long-term peacebuilding. This should 
be reflected in the policies of the United Nations, international financial 
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institutions and donors, and should be given priority in long-term policy 
and funding.” (para 229) 
 
This understanding sees Peacebuilding as a more encompassing term which aims not 
at organizing the civil-military components of a peacekeeping mission in the aftermath of 
conflict only, but centrally aims at integrating all different kinds of policies directed at 
the prevention of conflict and coping with fragility (see figure four).  
 
Figure 4: The broad Version of Peacebuilding 
 
 
Critiques of such a wide understanding (e.g. Paris in Rocha Menocal and Kirkpatrick 
2005:767) point out that “defining peace building to include such a wide range of 
development, security, and governance assistance makes it very difficult to distinguish 
causes and effects” and that a blurring of agendas does little to prevent and cope the 
outbreak of large-scale violence.  
 
Summary 
 
Peacebuilding is broad framework that has been primarily developed and used in the 
context of the UN. The main emphasis is on coping with the challenges of reconstruction 
in a post-peacekeeping phase, while in practical terms the concept has pivotally been 
used to strengthen coordination efforts between the various agencies that operate in post-
conflict environments. Rather than suggesting specific policy priorities or arguing for a 
specific relation between security and development measures, the concepts primary 
function is to facilitate debate and coordination on post-conflict issues in a flexible 
manner.  
 
The proliferation of the concept of peacebuilding needs to be seen as a response to 
two developments. Firstly, the practice of widening UN peacekeeping mandates to cover 
different aspects of political, societal and economic reform up to the organization of 
interim administration, going far beyond traditional mandates of monitoring or peace 
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enforcement. This widening increased the need for having integrated frameworks to 
organize missions and to coordinate with the other actors (than DPKO led armed forces) 
involved in post-conflict activities. Secondly, the conclusion of a negative record of 
peacekeeping efforts. While the question of the overall record of peacekeeping remains 
highly contested among academics (depending crucially on how success and failure are 
measured) , the results of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacekeeping (Smith 2004) and the 
2003 report of the World Bank (Collier et al 2003) raised awareness that a high number 
of countries that had been object of peacekeeping efforts relapsed into conflict within five 
years. The relapse problem raised recognition that more needs to be done, and that 
activities need to be better coordinated.  
 
A divergence among different understandings of peacebuilding exists (Barnett et al 
2007), concerning notably two aspects: a) whether the term should refer to post-conflict 
situations (meaning largely post peacekeeping engagement) alone, or also include 
preventive measures applicable in situations of fragility or risk of conflict; b) whether 
peacebuilding should be interpreted in a narrow sense, as referring to measures which 
have immediate impact on security situations, or if it is to be understood as more 
encompassing in referring also to medium and long term projects in fields such as 
infrastructure, health, unemployment and education, and address the “root causes” of 
conflict.  
 
While both understandings of Peacebuilding take the state and populations in conflict 
zones as the main referent object, they clearly divide in what way they give priority to 
security concerns. It is in the narrow understanding that security concerns are prioritized 
(cp. table one).  
 
Table 1: Broad and Narrow Concepts of Peacebuilding 
 Narrow Broad 
Situations Post-Conflict “Risk” of major violence 
Measures Kick-off Analysis, early-warning, 
prevention, re-constructing 
Major 
Challenge 
Civil-military Coordination 
(Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding)  
Prevention 
Primacy? Security  Development 
Convergence? No Yes 
Major 
Referents 
“South”, Regions, State, Regime, 
People 
“South”, Regions, States, Regime, 
People, Groups, Individuals 
 
 
2.4 The Security-Development Nexus and Human Security 
 
A framework of integrating development and security thinking, which stems 
primarily out of development discourses, but also gained a strong foothold in security 
circles, is the framework of human security. The main idea of Human Security is that the 
major referent object of security concerns should be the “human”. Human Security has 
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been largely developed as an attempt to replace orthodox security. What are the needs of 
humans, how can they be guaranteed and how those needs can be delivered remains 
however deeply contested.  
 
 
The term “human security” was the first time brought prominently on the 
international agenda by UNDP in the frame of its 1994 Human Development Report 
(UNDP 1994), which was drafted for the 1995 World Summit on Social Development. 
The 1995 Copenhagen declaration, the outcome document of the World Summit, 
officially embraced it as a guiding concept for development work. The UNDP Report was 
drafted by a small team around economist Haq, prominent for his concept of human 
development – attempting to widen the notion of development as referring to different 
types of entitlements (cp Gaspers 2005). Haq’s proposal was clearly motivated 
strategically, as he saw a chance for redirecting the resources, which had been bound by 
cold war security, for development purposes. The 1994 Report understood human 
security as  
 
“first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. 
And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in 
the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” 
(UNDP 1994: 23). 
 
The Report suggested that security should refer to seven sectors, namely it should 
address economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political 
security.  
 
Two governments, Canada and Japan, became major proponents of human security 
and both adopted it as a guiding principle for their foreign policy (Werthes and Debiel 
2007). To some degree, the further formulation of the concept can be read as a conceptual 
race between Canada and Norway on the one side and Japan and UNDP on the other. 
Canada advocating for a narrow understanding (focused on “freedom from fear”) and 
Japan for an extended one (as also including “freedom from want”) On Canadian and 
Norwegian initiative in 1998 the Human Security Network (HSN) was founded, a 
network of like-minded states and transnational activist groups coordinating their actions 
under the header of Human Security on a regular base.  The group convenes once a year 
at the level of foreign ministers, and the ministers also meet every year during the Session 
of the UN General Assembly.  
 
Associated to it the so called “Friends of Human Security”, an even more loose 
network of various agencies with interest in human security, hold regular meetings. The 
HSN defined: “In essence, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to 
people's rights, their safety or even their lives” (HSN 2009).  
 
The concept was used as a reference in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(Matthews et al. 2007) where it served to argue for the importance of the security of 
individuals, which leading to the 1997 Ottawa Convention. In addition, the campaign for 
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the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was carried on under the flag of 
human security. In both cases the HSN was a major advocating group.  
 
 
The Japanese government in turn funded in 1999 a Human Security Trust Fund as 
part of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Human 
Security was broadly referenced in the intellectual work of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2000-2001). From 2001 to 2003 an 
independent commission was installed to further develop the concept. The Commission 
on Human Security, funded mainly by the Japanese government was co-chaired by 
development economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen and former UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata. Human security is defined by the 
Commission  
 
“as protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of 
life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive 
(widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on 
people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, 
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give 
people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.” (CHS 
2003:X) 
 
Human security was referenced as a core principle for UN activities in the Report of 
the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP 2003-2004) and the 
2000 and 2005 Reports of UN secretary general Kofi Annan “We the people” and “In 
larger Freedom” set the stage to institutionalize human security.  
 
Broad and Narrow versions 
 
While in the conduct of this process, an identifiable concept Human Security was 
manufactured, different interpretations or versions of it circulate. There is divergence 
over three dimensions. This concerns firstly the content of human security. "While all 
proponents of human security agree that its primary goal should be the protection of 
individual human lives, they differ as to what the individual should be protected from" 
(Shani 2007:4). This leads to differentiating between a narrow and a broad understanding. 
The narrow understanding claims to prioritize insecurities and to include only physical or 
military threats to survival. The broader understanding aims to integrate a wider range of 
threats and centrally adds non-physical aspects and notions of injustice, such as economic 
(mis-)distribution, socio-cultural (mis-)recognition and political (mis-)representation.  
 
Secondly, conceptions of human security differ over who the subjects of human 
security are. One version prioritizes the territorial state. In upholding Westphalian 
sovereignty it is claimed that states have to be the primary provider of security for people 
and if states fail to do so, groups of states have to intervene to protect them. A second 
version attempts to give primacy to people protecting themselves and stresses the role of 
non-state or sub-state organizations in assisting them to do so. Thirdly, human security is 
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either conceptualized in negative or in positive terms. The negative one understands 
security as the absence of threats, usually framed by understanding security as ‘freedom 
from a threat’. The positive one defines security as the existence of possibilities to 
protect, usually framed in terms of ‘empowerment’ or ‘emancipation’.  
 
The different understandings, we only provide here a sketch of, are advocated by or 
attached to different communities. For instance, a narrow, state centred, negative version 
has been associated with Canadian activities and the Human Security Network. Also, 
military organizations (such as the US military or NATO) tend to make use of such a 
narrow understanding. The concept of the Responsibility to Protect (discussed below) 
centrally relies on the idea of a narrow understanding of human security. The wider, non-
state centred, negative version is supported by Japan, finds foothold in development 
communities and is centrally advocated by the UN. The positive version is mainly 
attached to academic communities such as the Welsh School in Security Studies (Booth 
2007), but also to (cosmopolitan) political theorists and philosopher communities more 
broadly. A clear-cut differentiation of versions and agencies makes however only 
partially sense, at least if the criteria of usage is applied. For instance, the Human 
Security Network, heavily borrows, as Gaspers (2005) notes, from a broader 
understanding, which is confirmed given that it engages in issues such as health. Hence, 
we cannot conclude that any community is fully attached to one version of human 
security. Rather situations define which actors use which version.  
 
Summary 
 
While peacebuilding has evolved as a relatively pragmatic, UN sponsored framework 
centred on issues of coordination, human security is a framework that has spurred much 
more controversy.  The reason is initially that the framework does not aim at amending, 
coordinating or integrating existing security and development thinking and practice, but 
has been understood as argument to replace and challenge existing security 
conceptualization. Opponents of the concept point out that the concept is too broad and 
ambiguous for either analytical purposes or policy guidance. For instance, Roland Paris 
(2001, 2004) argues that human security distracts analysts from a proper understanding of 
strategic affairs (2001: 88), that human security is “sprawling and ambiguous”, a 
“hodgepodge of principles and objectives” (2001:92), is “so vague” that it verges on the 
meaningless (2001: 101) and does not help policymakers, who want to know what to do.  
 
Despite this general rejection of human security on epistemological or policy-related 
grounds, the more promising controversy has evolved around the question of the relation 
of a (traditional) state-centric understanding of security and the people-centred 
understanding underlined by human security. Traditional security analysts argue that 
human security is no true challenger to state security, as states remain the major providers 
of people’s security. Yet, as human security advocates hold against this position, it is the 
case that states are the major security providers in the Western and developed sphere, 
while it is not in the case of weak statehood, where it is often the state that presents 
intentionally (e.g. through political oppression or politics of ethnic divisions) or 
unintentionally (e.g. through inaction or lacking institutional capabilities) the major threat 
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for the security of people. The solution or balancing act between those two position has 
been to understand human and state security as complementary, and to suggest the need 
for a focus on human security (and international intervention) for cases when there is a 
mismatch between state and people security, and emergencies arise for which states 
internally do have no way to respond – which is the solution outlined in the frame of the 
“responsibility to protect”.  
 
Table 2: Broad and Narrow Concepts of Human Security 
 Narrow Broad 
Situations Physical threats to survival “Freedom from want” 
Measures Protection of civilians Whole range of security and 
development policies 
Major 
Challenge 
Sovereignty concerns Intervention 
Primacy? Security Development 
Convergence? No Yes 
Major 
Referents 
“South”, Regions, State, Regime, 
People 
“South”, States, Regime, People, 
Groups, Individuals 
 
 
2.5. The Security-Development Nexus and the Global War on Terror 
 
While peacebuilding and human security are children of the 1990s, suggesting either 
a pragmatic framework for “doing better” (peacebuilding), or attempting to shift 
international policy resources towards development (human security), a third framework 
of connecting security and development has emerged as a response to the terrorist attacks 
of September 11th: The Global War on Terror (GWOT). The fact that the 9-11 attackers 
organized in Afghanistan, a weak state, led to a major re-evaluation of poverty, under-
development and weak statehood by security analysts. 9-11 marked a paradigm shift for 
(even the most traditional) security analysis, as it became evident that international 
security could not be longer thought and addressed as a question of inter-state affairs, but 
that due to the transnational character of threats, security had to be addressed in global 
terms (Buzan 2007).  
 
GWOT spurred a different kind of connection between security and development. 
While the major referent objects of peacebuilding and human security are the people 
living in underdeveloped states or respectively in under-developed regions, in the GWOT 
framework the major referent is global stability, and in extension the security of Western, 
developed states. As Beall et al (2006) argue this revision of the security-development 
nexus did not only affect the US, which always had been more inclined to view 
development policies as part of larger strategic considerations, but the majority of 
Northern States. While such a frame initially provides a better legitimation for justifying 
resources for intervention (as the link between underdevelopment and security is more 
immediate), the emphasis is on whether and how which underdeveloped states constitute 
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a threat for global security. Under this conceptualization the least developed states, now 
projected as “failed states” were conceived as a major threat to security.  
 
 
Yet, current research does not support a direct causal link between underdevelopment 
(state failure) and transnational threats (e.g. Hehir 2007, Patrick 2007). While some 
country cases ranked as the least developed countries, indicate that state failure can be a 
significant source of global threats (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan), others show only a weak 
link (e.g. Burundi, Malawi).  
 
Indeed, for many analysts “the idea of failed states as a security threat is […] an 
exaggerated one" (Chandler 2006:189-90). Yet, relative little empirical analysis has been 
conducted on the link between state failure and transnational threats. As Patrick (2007: 
644) puts it: “What is striking is how little empirical analysis has been undertaken to 
document and explore the connection between state failure and transnational security 
threats.” The most pervasive threat of this kind, backed up by the case of Afghanistan, is 
terrorism. Prominent is the safe-haven argument, the claim that underdeveloped states 
provide the breading grounds for global terrorism. The threat menacing the international 
community derives from sub-state groups that thrive on the conditions endemic in fragile 
states. In the frame of GWOT, however, the underdevelopment-global insecurity link has 
also been widened as covering other issues. Crucially this has been the case of armed 
robbery at sea and piracy. Piracy, an issue becoming emergent in 2007 and 2008 with 
major global initiatives being taken, has been directly linked by some analysts to terrorist 
activities. While GWOT is a powerful international agenda, especially advocates of a 
peacebuilding framework (e.g. Tschirgi 2003) have expressed concerns that GWOT 
channels resources towards military rather than development expenses. Moreover, as it is 
argued GWOT directs attention to immediate strategic threats, rather than to an 
overarching, long term involvement.  
 
Summary 
 
GWOT can be seen as the current most influential framework fostering the link 
between development and security as the emergency and threatening character of 
underdevelopment comes to the fore. In the framework there is clearly the idea that 
development activities should be subordinated to the strategic and tactic goals of security 
thinking due to the construction of state failure as a threat. Yet, given the change in 
strategy in the paradigmatic case of engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the balance 
sheet might be turning.  
 
2.6 Summary 
 
In this section we discussed three major approaches for thinking security and 
development as interdependent. While all of these frameworks underline to think about 
security and development in broad and holistic terms, the difference between them lay 
clearly in the way in which they prioritize security or development thinking and 
measures. Both peacebuilding and human security are controversial in the sense that 
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immanent in both frameworks is the controversy how far into the broader development 
agendas the framework should be stretched – and indeed if the general development 
agenda should still be separated. As argued peacebuilding is the more pragmatic 
framework in this regard, less centered on conceptual issues, but more problem-centered. 
Human security has initially been a clear pull towards development, yet also in this case 
controversy between a broad and narrow school persists, and it is doubtful that these 
controversy can be settled by any means of conceptual discussion. For the case of GWOT 
we find a clear tendency to integrate security and development with the purpose to 
subordinate the development tool box under strategic needs.  
 
The concepts can be sorted along two axes: first, the way they give primacy for 
security or development thinking, second, the way in which suggest that security and 
development thinking are sets of practices, which converge (suggesting they can be 
“integrated”) or diverge (suggesting that they need to be “coordinated”) (see figure 
below). Concepts of a converging character stress the need for transforming security and 
development organization into a coherent set of policies to form a new field of foreign 
policy. Concepts with an underlying view of divergence, in turn, point to the different 
histories of both fields (notably the history of military organizations as war fighting 
organizations) and emphasize the need for organizing the dialogue between the fields 
through coordination as well as drawing clear boundaries between them.  
 
Figure 5: SDN Frameworks 
 
 
Concerning the referent objects underlying each conceptions, we also see significant 
differences.  
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Figure 6: Referent Objects of SDN Frameworks 
 
 
 
It is important for the discussion of policies towards fragility and conflict to keep 
these difference in conceptualizations in mind. Often the different meanings of concepts 
are not clarified. The several documents of the EU, for instance the Review Paper on the 
European Security Strategy (European Council 2008), gives reference to all three 
frameworks, it mentions the terrorist threat and its link with fragility and conflict, it refers 
to peacebuilding and to human security. Yet especially the meaning of human security 
and peacebuilding is not further defined.   
 
3. Security and Development: What do we know?  
 
In this section, we examine some of the claims associated with the security-
development nexus. What do we actually (think we) know? While we cannot discuss all 
the controversies carried out in the numerous disciplines and subdisciplines investigating 
issues relevant to the security-development nexus – like development economics, 
development studies, post-development studies, international relations, security and 
strategic studies, military sociology, international law, psychology, anthropology and 
sociology -, we focus on the most significant claim regarding the relation between 
fragility and insecurity. We argue that our knowledge of these complex dynamics remain 
limited.  
 
Following our framework of different referent objects, we structure our discussion in 
moving from the Northern spectrum (nation states) via global concerns, to regional 
concerns and finally the substate dimension which makes up the major part of our 
discussion. While we attempt to cover as many issues (ranging from military to societal 
issues, table two provides an initial overview), we will not cover all aspects that could be 
considered as relevant. In these cases, or where we find a general lack of either reliable or 
accessible studies, we shall refer the reader to additional references.  
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Table 2: Examples of Referent Objects across Issue Areas 
 National Regional Global Security Issues 
Development 
Issues 
Military 
Integrity of 
Territory 
Regional 
Stability 
Global 
Stability 
Invasion, 
Transnational 
terrorism 
Security Sector 
Reform 
Economic 
Welfare/ 
Markets 
Resources 
Regional 
Markets, 
Resources 
Global 
Financial 
Markets, 
Trade 
Financial 
Fraud,  
Transnational 
Organized 
Crime 
Welfare, 
Growth, 
Unemployment, 
Infrastructure 
Society 
National 
Identity 
Regional 
Identity 
Human 
Rights 
Migration,  
Minority 
Rights 
Social 
Cohesion, 
Equality 
Environmental 
National 
Environment 
Regional 
Environment 
Global 
Environment 
Climate 
Change,  
Desertification 
Pollution, 
Environmental 
Crime 
Pollution 
Political 
Integrity of 
Regime 
Integrity of 
Regional 
Organization 
(EU, AU) 
International 
Norms 
(Sovereignty) 
Revolutions 
and Military 
Coups,  
Intervention 
Non-
Compliance 
Participation, 
Working 
Governance 
Structures 
 
 
 
3.2 The Global Link Between Security and Development  
 
 Do situations of fragility, and of underdevelopment more generally, significantly 
affect the security of the EU? As summarized by Hehir 2007 and Patrick 2007, the 
overall finding of the research devoted to the broad link between underdevelopment and 
security is that there is no direct causal link between fragility and global threats. Some 
countries are undoubtedly sources of politically stated threats, others are not. Some 
country ranked as the least developed countries, indicate that fragility can be a significant 
source of global threats (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan), others show only a weak link (e.g. 
Burundi, Malawi). Moreover, not all of the threats associated with fragility are 
significant. Organized crime activities, such as cyber crime, financial fraud or the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destructions are hardly to be found in failed states. In 
sum, for many analysts “the idea of failed states as a security threat is […] an 
exaggerated one" (Chandler 2006:189-90).  
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Yet, relative little empirical analysis has been conducted on the link between fragility 
and transnational threats and risks. As Patrick (2007: 644) puts it: “What is striking is 
how little empirical analysis has been undertaken to document and explore the connection 
between state failure and transnational security threats.” The majority of analysis so far 
has investigated the link between terrorism and state fragility.  
 
Fragile States and Terrorism  
 
Terrorism is the most pervasive threat linked to state failure. The evidence for such a 
link is based on the case of Afghanistan. Yet generalizing from the Afghan case, in which 
the Taliban regime provided an operational base for Al Quaeda, is problematic. The 
general claim that underdeveloped, fragile or failed states provide the breading grounds 
for global terrorism and given international operating terrorist groups a safe haven is not 
statistically supported. As the literature indicates, the connection between state weakness 
and transnational terrorism is more complicated and tenuous than often assumed 
(Newman 2007, Stewart 2007, Hehir 2007). Not all fragile and failed states are afflicted 
by terrorism. Terrorist groups have emerged from, and operated within, countries which 
have strong, stable states and a variety of systems of government as well. They operate in 
fragile and failed states but it is not necessarily the condition of fragile or failed 
statehood, which explains their presence. Moreover, fragile and failing states may be of 
declining importance to transnational terrorists, given that terrorist have diffused in more 
global networks with autonomous cells in dozens of countries which might be poor and 
wealthy (see e.g. Korteweg 2008, Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). While further analysis is 
needed on the conditions the gives rise to global terrorism, existing research suggests 
caution towards making a general claim that state fragility causes terrorism and orienting 
policy towards fragility at the fight against terrorism.  
 
Failed States and Piracy 
 
A second, more recent link between state failure and global threats has been made by 
the issue of piracy. The recent activities of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden 
suggests that failed states give piracy organizations an operational base. The dimensions 
that piracy has reached in this region (with major oil tankers and even weapon deliveries 
hold hostage), and the significant naval response of the international community (with 
UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and the EU sponsored anti-piracy operation 
Atalanta) indicate that here indeed a major threat to the security of the global market, to 
the property of shipping companies as well as the personal security of seamen (though it 
is reported that seamen have been generally treated well) exists. Yet, again the literature 
suggests caution towards generalizing from the Somalian case. As Nincic (2008), in the 
major statistical exploration of the state failure-piracy link so far, suggests, state Failure 
is a necessary but not a sufficient conditions for pirate activities. Which conditions of 
underdevelopment favor piracy and armed robbery and how this activities link with 
international terrorism is an underexplored issue (Nincic 2008).  
 
 
Non-Democracy as a Threat 
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A different and often more implicit link between state failure and global threats has 
been made in the frame of linking democracy or good governance and peace. The 
argument, centrally promoted since the beginning of the 1990s by US administrations 
starting under Clinton, but shaping UN, NATO and EU strategy (Rasmussen 2001, Owen 
2005, Russett 2005, Bueger and Villumsen 2007) has been that democratic states are 
peaceful in their relation to each other, and in extension non-democratic states present 
major global security threats. Fragility and state-failure has been defined as the absence 
of democratic structures, and in consequence these states are threats to global security. 
Yet, while the positive link between democratic governance and peaceful relations is 
backed by statistical evidence (and even has been declared a “fact”) this is hardly the case 
for the negative link. In other words non-democratic states are not necessarily a security 
threat. Moreover, as Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 1996) suggest adolescent and 
democratizing states might be more war-prone (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 1996). 
Concluding from the evidence on democratic peace that non-democratic states are a 
threat is hence problematic.  
 
3.3 Vicious Circles and the Root Cause Agenda 
 
While research on the causes of violence and war has a long-standing tradition (e.g. 
Wright 1942), emphasis shifted in the 1990s towards the study of civil war, given the 
increasing diagnosis that the majority of wars were no longer fought between states, but 
within states. Also civil war could no longer be explained in reference to colonial 
independency or the cold war super power struggle. It has been mainly two traditions or 
schools which have shaped the debate and constitute today the mainstream on the cause 
of civil war, state failure, and fragility (cp. Woodward 2007). This is firstly a cultural-
economic school centered on research teams, such as the World Bank team led by Paul 
Collier or the Minority at Risk project. Secondly, a political-regime school, centred on 
democratic peace research, already briefly discussed. Both of these schools today feed 
into a contemporary mainstream model that projects countries as being catched in a 
vicious cycle of poverty and insecurity, and which suggests that policies towards civil 
conflict and fragility should be directed at removing the causes identified by the two 
schools. Let us briefly discuss the main arguments by both schools.  
 
The cultural argument projects wars as being fought over the political consequences 
of cultural differences. The causes of war are hence cultural (or ethnical) differences and 
discrimination of (culturally defined) minorities. Culturally divided societies or societies 
of repressed minorities (Kaufman 1996, Gurr 1993). The cultural argument has been 
translated into a policy agenda, which lays high emphasis on power sharing agreements, 
regional autonomy and mechanisms of minority protection.  
 
The economic argument suggests that civil war is caused by rebels seeking economic 
gain (Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001). Rather than cultural differences the 
main cause is here seen in the motivations of maximizing gain and in the opportunity 
structures in which rebels have the condition to finance and sustain a rebellion against a 
government. Policies following the economic causes argument have either aimed at 
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economic sanctions or other regulatory measures to hinder the financing of conflict (e.g. 
the Kimberly Process), or in the immediate post-conflict situation at establishing resource 
management systems and security sector reform (Pugh et al 2004).  
 
The political-regime argument sees the main cause for civil war in authoritarian rule 
or in the absence of democratic government structures. Authoritarian regimes or weak 
states live in what has been described as the insecurity-dilemma. Regimes need to use 
violence to secure their power, while this violence causes in turn more resistance to the 
regime (Jackson 1999). Democracy is projected as the best mechanism for non-violence 
conflict resolution and seen as a preventive mechanism (Rummel 1995). The regime 
argument has led to policies placing emphasis on creating democratic structures to 
prevent conflict and help to sustain post-conflict peace agreements (Smith 2003, Guiholt 
2007).  
 
All three arguments have shaped the policy responses towards fragility, state failure 
and civil conflict considerable and form part of what can be summarized as the root 
causes agenda towards fragility. Yet, while current policies are directly inspired by this 
research, more recent investigations firstly shed doubt on these earlier results, and 
secondly, suggest that policies directed towards these three root causes might even be 
counter-productive. As Susan Woodward (2007:154) argues,  
 
“current policies tend to be based on research that has been superseded 
[…]. If effective peacebuilding depends on addressing ‘root causes’ and 
the knowledge on which these policies are based is wrong, then our 
intervention may do more harm than we would by ignoring the causes 
altogether” 
 
Let us briefly discuss the research that criticizes earlier finding internally and those 
studies that suggest a different agenda than a focus on root cause.  
 
The cultural difference argument has been challenged by research such as that of 
Fearon and Latin (2003) and Sambanis (2000). Ethnically heterogeneous societies are 
less inclined to civil war than homogenous ones. Moreover, recent research shows that 
conflicts related to cultural difference are so situation-specific that little can be followed 
from large-N statistical analysis (e.g. Posner 2005). As argued by Suhrke and colleagues 
(2005) the economic argument also suffers from serious methodological constraints 
including coding errors, that the conclusions drawn from this research are hardly reliable. 
Scholars studying the microdynamics of violence and civil war suggest moreover that 
incentives and opportunity structures are hardly a sufficient explanation (e.g. Kalyvas 
2006).  
 
The political regime (or democratic) argument has been considerably challenged by 
results that suggest that less developed states, with intermediate levels of democracy have 
the highest level of political repression and violence (Regan and Henderson 2002). Some 
scholars go as far as to argue that in some cases people might be better off in a status of 
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anarchy, than in any kind of weak institutional regime structure (Duffield 2002, Leeson 
and Williams 2008).  
 
External critiques of the root cause research and policy agenda largely make two 
arguments. Firstly, national aggregations of the outbreak of civil war do tell us little about 
violence in civil war (escalation and de-escalation). Second, war and large scale violence 
(especially in the mid and long-term) does fundamentally transform societies and 
political orders, and these new forms of organization need to be taken in account for 
designing policies (rather than orienting policies at a pre-conflict state).  
 
In a major contribution Stathis Kalyvas (2006) has argued that to explain violence 
one must look at the personal and local level rather than on the national. Kalyvas suggests 
that if one looks at the personal and village or town level motivations and incentives, the 
causes suggested by studies on the national level are rather meta-narratives. Narratives 
that justify violence, but do not cause it. These narratives (such as ethnical or economic 
ones) are important in mobilizing violence. In consequence policies directed at 
preventing a reversion of violence must look at the local level and personal and 
community motivations.  
 
That civil wars transform societies and economies as well political orders is a well 
known fact, as Charles Tilly (1988) classically argued the contemporary European 
political order is the outcome of a collective experience of violence and warfare. In other 
words, the transformations caused by civil wars are not necessarily negative, but also 
provide opportunities. Yet, orienting intervention at the pre-conflict state (the causes of 
the war) does lead to a relative neglect of how violence has transformed a country.  
 
 
3.5 Summary: The Limits of Knowledge 
 
In sum, existing social scientific knowledge about whether fragility and conflict 
presents a considerable source of global threats and what causes conflict and fragility is 
uncertain and contentious. Policies relying on gross generalizations can be counter-
productive. Yet, current policy development also shows that more tailored, analytically 
based, country-oriented approaches are being taken. It is these initiatives that we want to 
review next, and sketch the persistent dilemmas inherent in these responses.  
 
4. Re-organizing security and development policies 
 
In this section we discuss the major policy responses to the security-development 
nexus. Those responses can be differentiated in, architectural responses – the re-
organization and maintenance of new bureaucratic infrastructures –, emergency responses 
policies – tools developed to cope with situations that have identified as emergency 
situations –, long-term structural policies directed towards prevention and re-construction 
– policies in post-conflict situations, situations that are on the verge of the outbreak of 
conflict, and policies towards countries which are in a long-term violent state.  
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How far current policies have departed from a one size fits all strategy? In what way 
do current policies lead to a more technocratic, mechanistic thinking or towards a case-
sensitive pragmatic thinking? Secondly, we address the questions raised in the beginning, 
in how far can we see in current policies a trend towards a prioritization of security or of 
development? Is there a tendency to subordinate development policies under security 
concerns? Or can we conclude a process of developmentization of security policies?  
 
4.1 New architectures 
 
An Overview 
 
A wide range of actors from academia, think tanks, international organizations, non-
governmental bodies and governmental agencies have been active in developing toolkits 
for integrating security and development. In the following, we limit our discussion to the 
approaches of the main donor agencies, namely the approaches take by the governments 
of the UK and the USA, by the European Union (EU) and Commission (EC) and by the 
World Bank (WB) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), which have been very active in developing strategies and doctrines.  
 
OECD 
 
Recognizing the limits of policies of development conditionality in the context of 
fragility and seeing the need for continuous engagement in these countries, OECD set up 
in 2003 a Fragile States Group within the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC).  
 
The focus of the group is on analysis as well as donor coordination, the improvement 
of the effectiveness of aid effectiveness, and the delivery of services in states referred to 
as “difficult partnerships”, meaning largely primarily those states emerging from violent 
conflict. The Group’s main emphasis lies on policy coherence and coordination among 
agencies active in the fields of security and development. Centrally the OECD has 
produced a set of “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States”. 
These documents emphasize the necessity of joined-up action among political, economic, 
security, and development actors at the local, national, regional, and multilateral level. 
The Group has explicitly addressed questions of counter-terrorism policies (OECD/DAC 
2003) and the security-development nexus more broadly (OECD/DAC 2005).  
 
World Bank 
 
With a similar motivation as OECD, and a surprisingly similar approach being taken 
(Debiel et al 2007:7), the World Bank has become one of the major actors in developing 
doctrines and strategies for contexts of fragility. Crucial has been the task force on “Low 
Income Countries Under Stress” (LICUS). The LICUS group foregrounds that “state-
building is the central objective in fragile states, and that effective donor programs 
require integrated approaches across the political-security-development nexus”.  
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Recognizing that development has been become increasingly conditional, which leads 
donor countries to withdraw from countries which need assistance the most, the Group 
aims at preventing neglect towards these countries and fostering a continuing engagement 
with them. By cooperating with other international actors such as the OECD, the UN, the 
EU, and bilateral donors, the initiative seeks to promote donor harmonization and the 
development of joint assessments and strategies, while raising awareness to the 
constraints of low capacity in fragile states.  
 
Central in the debate has been the World Bank’s research programme on “The 
Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence” seeking to understand the origins of 
organized violence. Directed by economist Paul Collier, the team comprises of 
economists as well as security analysts. The main approach taken by this analytical unit is 
a statistical and economic one, in focusing on factors such as reliance on a primary 
products, the proportion of young men education, factionalism, lack of political rights or 
economic inequality.  
 
US government 
 
The US government has launched several initiatives that aim at integrating security 
and development. Central has been here the idea of 3D (Defense, Development and 
Diplomacy), of integrating the different available foreign policy toolboxes.  
 
Interagency coordination of conflict prevention and post-conflict-reconstruction is 
conducted by the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, which was established 
within the Department of State in August 2004. The office includes representatives from 
the Departments of State and Defense, USAID, the CIA, and the military’s Joint Staff. 
Based on the Iraq experience (Sovacool and Halfon 2007), the Department of Defense 
has defined what they call stability operations as a “core U.S. military mission” that will 
have priority comparable to combat operations.  In 2006 the US started the restructuring 
of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with the objective of 
strengthening coordination and alignment between U.S. foreign and development policy. 
This shift aims to consolidate authority over the budgeting, planning, and implementation 
of all State and USAID foreign aid programs within one office (US Department of State 
and USAID 2003, USAID 2005).  
 
UK government 
 
The UK was one of the first governments aiming at integrating security and 
development through their so called “joined-up” government approach. The central 
achievement of this approach was the establishment of the Global Conflict Prevention 
Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool in 2001. These Pools aim at integrating the 
expertise of the different ministries and provide common funding for them. In September 
2004 a Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was established (UK 2004), which is 
since 2006 fully operational. The PCRU is tasked with (a) improving civilian-military 
links in planning and implementing post-conflict reconstruction policies and (b) 
strengthening coordination between the U.K. and other international actors.  
  
31 
 
The EU 
 
Also the EU has played a visible leadership role in finding integrated and coherent 
responses. These institutions are embedded within the framework of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
Within the Commission, the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit was 
established in 2001 as part of DG External Relations. The purpose of the Unit is to 
coordinate the Commission’s conflict prevention activities, integrating conflict 
prevention into the programming of EU foreign aid, overseeing a Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism that provides quick and flexible funding in urgent pre and post-conflict 
situations, and maintaining contact with key international actors such as the United 
Nations, the OECD, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and international financial 
institutions.  
 
Within the Council, a number of bodies and committees has been established, the 
Political and Security Committee, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, the Joint 
Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Directorate-General for Civilian Crisis Management and 
Coordination, the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff, and the Committee for 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). These units aim at coordinating 
civilian conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, strengthening civil-
military cooperation, and centrally providing forums for consultation and coordination 
among EU member states.  
 
The objectives stated in the 2010 Headline Goal and 2008 Civilian Headline Goal (in 
the framework of ESDP) outline the priorities of enhancing multifunctional crisis 
response capabilities, fostering civil-military cooperation, and strengthening 
interoperability among the civilian and defense capabilities of Member States. The 
November 2005 “European Consensus on Development” similarly underscores the EU 
commitment to improve coordination among EU donors internally and externally, as well 
as coordinating with the security policies of the EU. The statement underlines the need 
for development policy to focus on the problem of state fragility and conflict prevention, 
by providing support for governance reforms, rule of law mechanisms, anti-corruption 
measures, and the establishment of viable state institutions.  
 
Coordination mechanisms  
 
Although these initiatives do not entail major organizational restructuring or high 
level budget shifts, they imply that much international activity has been spend on 
developing administrative and operational integration mechanisms and analytical 
responses for linking security and development. The word coordination appears over and 
over in the debates about security and development. This is not surprising since 
coordination has been well-identified long ago as one of the taken-for-granted, but ill-
defined, notion of sound planning (Wildavsky 1979, 131-132). The absence of major 
reforms and reliance on clear frameworks has caused some doubt among analysts if the 
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initiatives taken represent more then lip service and extended beyond symbolic reforms 
(Chandler 2007, Youngs 2008, Lockhart 2005).  
 
Coordinating instruments and their effects on policymaking and coherence, being a 
relatively novel policy instruments, have only spurred relatively little empirical research 
so far. Richard Young’s (2008) study suggests that coordination in the EU has only had 
little impact on policy practice, both in terms of mission practice, as well as donor 
practice. The reasons he identifies in the mutual misunderstandings between security and 
development actors, as well as in the relative abstract (rhetorical) level on which 
coordination operates. The guidelines of the EU, have neither specified the complexities 
of the development–security link or given many clues on how this is to be articulated in 
practice (Young 2008: 421). In relying on several interviews of both security and 
development actors, he suggests (Youngs 2008:422) that Policy Coherence for 
Development measures “appears to be more of a conceptual battleground pitching the 
development and security communities against each other”.  
 
Chandler (2007) and Paris (2006/8), both arguing from the perspective of a 
peacebuilding framework, point out that coordination instruments largely operate on a 
rhetorical level. Chandler goes as far as to suggest that coordinating instruments are a 
masquerade for inaction:  
 
“It often appears that at the institutional level it is preferable to engage in internal 
re-organization, ‘reorganizing the desk chairs’, with the claim to be taking a policy 
issue seriously, than it is to actually engage with the policy area itself.” (Chandler 
2007:371) 
 
Paris (2006/8) corresponds to this point in suggesting that coordination cannot replace 
action by all involved, and hence should be evaluated as one of available measures, 
which is necessary but not sufficient. In other words, something like a ‘coordination 
bubble’ has been developed, in which coordination is relatively detached from concrete 
difficult situations and practice. Such a viewpoint is supplemented by other studies, 
which have largely concentrated on the UN. As it is observed, the analytical and 
operative branches often do not communicate very well, and very often operative people 
hesitate to take into account analytical work (e.g. Bebbington et al. 2004).  
 
Chandler points to another problem of the emphasis of creating new organizations, 
the problem of responsibility:  
 
“the more coordination there is between domestic and international policy actors, 
the less policy responsibility lies with any one of them, and there has been no 
shortage of experimentation in this area” (Chandler 2007: 370) 
 
For Chandler the mere idea of coordinating the security-development nexus is one by 
which the different agencies want to escape their responsibility in a field where a high 
uncertainty exists of what can or should be done. Paris, being less critical to the ideas of 
coordination and coherence as such, sees one of the crucial mistakes in current 
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conceptions of coordinating organizations that they assume that it is already known what 
needs to be done. Yet, as he argues, and we suggested in section three, this is hardly the 
case and consequently organizational responses need to put much more emphasis on 
researching what needs to be done, prior to coordinating the activities of specialized 
agencies.  
 
The critiques raised in the studies of Young, Chandler, Paris and others (Jones (2002), 
Herrhausen (2007), de Coning (2007)) echo the results of the wider literature on 
coherence and coordinating government approaches.  
 
Carbone (2008) investigating policy coherence in EU development policy stresses 
that coherence is a relational term, meaning that policies will be considered as coherent 
from one perspective (let’s say trade), while less so from another (let’s say fishery).  
 
Other studies even suggest that coordination instruments can lead to a further 
fragmentation of governance as instruments hide value conflict. For instance in his 
analysis of city strategic partnerships, a coordination instrument at the local scale, Davies 
(2009) reveals that coordinating institutions establish only a shallow consensus over 
abstract goals, at the same time legitimating the avoidance of political value conflicts and 
in turn causing fragmented governance.  
 
As these studies suggest, there is no clear indication that current coordination 
initiatives have led to either a subordination or prioritization of security or development 
policies, because coordination has not been functioning well. Yet, the studies suggest that 
there is indeed a drift towards a standardization, given that the coordination mechanisms 
aim at developing guidelines and strategies for measurement. Given the weak relations 
between coordination bodies and actual everyday on the ground practice, there seems 
however enough space for context specific solutions.  
 
4.3 Emergency policies 
 
A large portion of the policy discussion and novel institutions has centered on how to 
respond to complex emergencies, humanitarian disasters and the outbreak of large scale 
violence. In the ESDP framework this has been the creation of crisis response 
mechanisms, as well the creation of early warning institutions. Indeed the question of 
how to prevent emergencies and how to cope with humanitarian catastrophes has been at 
the roots of linking security and development measures. To events of the 1990s have 
been of special significant: The failure to re-act to the Rwandan genocide and the role of 
humanitarian agencies in allowing the re-armament of rebel forces in the refugee camps 
of eastern democratic Republic of Congo. Second, the events of Srebrenica, the failure of 
peacekeeping forces to protect refugees in safe zones in the Bosnian War. While the 
question of when to and how to intervene in complex emergencies constitutes a debate in 
its own right, one part of the debate has spurred notable controversy between 
development and security actors: The question of the role of humanitarian agencies in 
(post-)conflict situations and their relation to military organizations.  
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Humanitarian and military agencies  
 
At the heart of the dilemma of the relation between humanitarian and military actors 
are the following observations  
 
 
 Humanitarian actors cannot engage if minimum security conditions are not met, 
as, in the case of ongoing violence, humanitarian actors might become the target 
of violence. High level of insecurity for aid workers reduce the amount and 
quality of aid provided (Harmer 2008: 535).  
  
 Humanitarian activities can have counter-productive consequences for a conflict 
(Anderson 1999, Goodhand 2002). Relief can help to re-organize violent groups 
or provide them with resources, and the aid delivered can become part of the 
resource struggles of a conflict itself. A sudden massive amount of aid runs risks 
of exacerbating conflicts, and these resources may become incentives to fight 
rather than a stimulus for peace.  
  
 Military actors have in recent years increasingly engaged in humanitarian 
activities (Huysmans 2002, PRT) either in protecting refugees, as in the case of 
Kosovo, or as part of larger Hearts and Minds strategy and counter-insurgency 
tactics.  
  
The responses to these observations have been the suggesting of “do no harm rules”, 
following Mary Anderson’s (1999) proposal on the one side, and on the other, increasing 
attempts to coordinate humanitarian and military actors on the ground.  
 
The “do no harm rules” have for instance found into OECD DAC Principles of Good 
Engagement in Fragile States. As OECD DAC (2007:1) outlines:  
 
 
“International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and 
worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and 
governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each 
case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities 
following serious cases of corruption or human rights violations must be 
carefully judged for their impact on domestic reform, conflict, poverty and 
insecurity.”  
 
As argued by OECD DAC, and in Anderson’s (1999) original proposal development 
and humanitarian actors must engage in a careful analysis how which humanitarian 
measure fuels into conflict, and whether they increase or decrease societal divisions, 
which are at the heart of a conflict or can lead to re-newed outbreak of a conflict. As 
Anderson suggests what possibly constitutes these divisions is highly context-dependent, 
analysis has hence to operate on a local level, not a national one. Yet, the do no harm 
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rules put a high pressure on aid agencies as well as donors to engage in sound political 
and conflict analysis, raising the question of analytical capabilities. Existing studies 
suggest that the overall quality of analysis is relatively poor (e.g. Cliffe and Luckham 
1999).  
 
The coordination of humanitarian and military components of a mission, such as in 
the framework of the UN concept of “integrated missions” (following the proposal of 
Brahimi), is an attempt to better organize the relation between military and humanitarian 
actors, but also to use available resources more efficient and in a more transparent way. 
Integrated missions have been implemented in the operations in Sierra Leone, Burundi, 
Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo .The EU in itself has 
not formulated an explicit integrated mission framework itself, given that it primarily 
engaged so far in the framework of the UN.  
 
Integrated missions have spurred considerable concerns among humanitarian actors 
and point to two further trade-offs of coordination and integrating security and 
development. The first concern is that integrated mission put humanitarian actors at risk. 
Given the main capital of humanitarian actors is their impartiality (not taking sides in a 
conflict), it is argued that being associated with a larger mission that also follows security 
and political objectives leads to a perception of local populations which sees 
humanitarian actors as political ones. The loss of impartiality makes humanitarian actors 
a direct target of violence. Yet, a major global survey organized by the British Oversea 
Development Institute finds these concerns unjustified. Harmer (2008) argues in 
summarizing the findings, that while there is an increase in violence towards aid workers, 
no direct relation between an integrated mission and the number of violent incidents can 
be identified.  
 
A second issue concerns, questions of expertise. Implementing a coordinated 
framework of engagement de facto means or has meant so far that decision making power 
on how to channels resources has been moved to actors which are either detached from 
the needs on the ground or simply lack the knowledge on how to organize humanitarian 
action best. These concerns are similar to those we have discussed on a general 
administrative level already, the risk of creating a coordination bubble, where the solution 
might be found in more de-centralized systems of coherence (Mosse et al 2002).  
 
4.4 Long term policies 
 
While it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between emergency policies and 
long-term engagements, given that some states are in permanent emergencies and often 
the distinction is based on an act of labeling, it makes sense to distinguish between 
policies directed at long term and at short term implications. By long term policies we 
can understand these policies which are rather directed at issues of fragility than conflict, 
and which operate in an environment where a peace agreement has shown stable over 
time, major violence has been halted (such as in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Sierra 
Leone), or the outbreak of violence has been (due to internal processes or external 
intervention) prevented (such as in Kenya or Zimbabwe). As formulated in the OECD 
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Principles or in the EU Development Consensus the overall direction here has been to 
engage in Statebuilding understood as engagements to facilitate state infrastructures (e.g. 
capacity building, administrative reform), establish a state monopoly of violence (e.g. 
security sector reform) and in establishing neo-liberal market structures (e.g. through 
property regimes, social welfare programmes, unemployment policies or regulatory 
systems). While again the statebuilding discussion constitutes a debate in its own right, 
let us point to a problematique that arises in the relation of security and development 
policies, namely the relation between regime and human security.  
 
Regime and Human Security – A trade off 
 
Scholars relying on in-depth (and often ethnographic) analysis of conflict 
constellations and its political economy highlight another challenge, which indeed points 
us to a predicament of the security/development nexus. The starting point is here how 
people cope with and live in situations of conflict and extreme under-development. 
Duffield (2002) has suggested for these practices the term of “actually existing 
development”.  
 
“Actually existing development is what keeps people alive and maintains social and 
political life in the face of adversity and an exclusionary international system. It includes 
the networks, flows and nodes of the shadow economy as well as the emerging and 
reflexive political complexes that are associated with it. It is an arena of survival in which 
the potentialities of modernity are exploited to the full and, in the process, identities and 
authorities are continually reproduced and changed. Actually existing development has 
not arisen because of “official” development: it has emerged despite it.” (Duffield 2002: 
83)  
 
The major difference in perspective compared for instance to the human security 
framework, is that the focus is not on the binary of the state/government vs. the people, 
but on considering the existence of different political units inside a state territory and how 
they organize political, social and economic life. This perspective is valuable insofar as it 
does not start with a normative evaluation of “good” and “bad” actors, nor does it 
consider the government in place as the only important political actor, or the state as the 
only significant social institution.  
 
The point in case is that weak statehood is characterized by the competition of several 
political factions and their networks, while the government in place is only one of them, 
usually maintaining networks which do not exceed the capital and its immediate 
surroundings.  
 
To provide an instance from the current policy debate: The former state of Somalia is 
now ruled by different political units, one of them being the government of Somalia, 
another being the rule in Somaliland, and yet another the piracy networks operating at the 
Northern borders (and often extending there influence over the Somalian border). As 
observed by Sanddorn (2009), the piracy networks do deliver what is described in 
development discourses as crucial public services: employment, health and indeed also 
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security, given that the pirate fleet started as a loose alliance of Somalian fishermen 
protecting their waters against foreign fishing vessels and environmental pollution. As it 
is highlighted by this case and others (such as the Afghanistan poppy networks, and other 
cases discussed in the nascent literature on warlordism ), what might be threatening for 
one actor (the international community, or the state), might the most important source of 
survival and development for others.  
 
Yet, pirates, smugglers, traffickers and other networks of the shadow economy are of 
course ambivalent units. As Duffield makes this point:  
 
“The institutions and relations of actually existing development, through the 
extensive networks of the shadow economy, are able to keep millions of people alive. At 
the same time, they are just as capable of taking it away: in some cases, on genocidal 
proportions.” (Duffield 2002: 86)  
 
The reliance of people’s survival on these networks not only poses a challenge for 
analysis –as a state-centric or government oriented view reveals little of these 
constellations and dynamics, but leads to a core predicament of the security/development 
nexus: The same networks that ‘keeps millions of people alive’ have been identified (as 
discussed above) as the major threats to global security and a fragile state. Fighting 
against these threats motivates and legitimizes international intervention in the first place. 
Yet constructing these networks as enemies, and accordingly fight them by military 
means, undermines the actual existing development and threatens the survival of people 
living under the auspices of these networks.  
 
In sum, there is a trade-off between the security objectives of the fragile regime and 
global security concerns, and the development of people. The question is hence, which of 
these concerns should be prioritized. Following this line of reasoning, Leeson and 
Williamson (2008) go one step further in suggesting that populations in situations of 
fragility might be in the medium term better off without a state, given that the best 
solution the fully functioning state following the Western model is not available to fragile 
states. These research results suggest the importance of considering other political units 
than the state and directing policies towards other (inter-mediate) goals then building a 
functioning state.  
 
4.5 Summary 
 
In this section, we reviewed a number of policy problematiques, namely the 
administrative challenge of integrating security and development, the question of the 
relation of humanitarian and military actors in emergency responses, and the question 
how security concerns implied by state-building, might undermine the actually existing 
development guaranteeing the survival of people living under conditions of fragility. 
Rather than suggesting answers to these problematiques we aimed at carving out the 
tradeoffs. Administrative coordination mechanisms might lead to a coordination bubble. 
While there is no clear evidence that integrated missions put aid workers at risk, they 
might lead to a lack of expertise on humanitarian issues. Statebuilding policies, in turn, 
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might deteriorate the conditions of life for people in situations of fragility. Yet, our 
review does not lead to the conclusion that there is a clear tendency towards either a 
securitization or a developmentization of policies. However, there is a visible trend 
towards administrative procedures and bureaucratic solutions.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The calls for more coherence and a “whole of EU” approach as a consequences of the 
security development nexus suggest nothing less than a turn from a European 
Development Policy and a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) towards a 
European Security and Development Policy. Yet, as we suggested this is not only 
difficult to achieve –  despite the institutional reforms necessary to do so, which we did 
not address in this paper – but also not necessarily productive.  
 
In the paper we developed our argument, by firstly suggesting that there are different 
positions on what the security-development nexus entails. We suggested that the nexus 
has been perceived as a conceptual chaos in which it is unclear what security or 
development is  constituted of; positions that are concerned that development policies are 
subordinated under security objectives (securitization of development), or that clear 
security strategies become impossible due to the considerations of development 
objectives (developmentization of  security). Moreover, the security development nexus 
has been perceived as a thinking tool to achieve greater coherence among foreign policy 
towards fragility and conflict, and as a policy agenda in which the major aim is to address 
the root causes of conflict. Following these different positions we firstly aimed at 
bringing some light in the conceptual debates of the security-development nexus. We 
suggested that no accurate or consensual definition of what constitutes development and 
security is most likely to be found. Instead we proposed a framework understanding 
development and security as means not as objectives and centrally adding transparency to 
the different claims of security and development by focusing on the referent objects these 
claims refer to. In the succeeding section we reviewed some of the major claims which 
are associated to the security development nexus,, and which can be summarized as the 
root cause agenda. We pointed out that to some degree we lack certain knowledge, and 
that policies better take flexible standpoints rather than betting on the cards, that polcies 
should aim at balancing cultural divisions, removing economic incentives for violence or 
establishing democratic regimes. Based on this discussion we review some policy 
problematiques and the political responses to them. We concluded that more integration 
is not necessarily better.  
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